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Abstract
When agents do not know where to find a match, they search. However, agents
could direct their search to agents who strategically choose a certain signal.
Introducing cheap talk to a model of sequential search with bargaining, we
find that signals will be truthful if there are mild complementarities in match
production: supermodularity of the match production function is a necessary
and sufficient condition. It simultaneously ensures perfect positive assortative
matching, so that single-crossing property and sorting condition coincide. As
the information from signals allows agents to avoid all unnecessary search, this
search model exhibits nearly unconstrained efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Search is a reaction to insufficient information: if we knew where to find the best available
option, we would not search for it. If a lack of information is thus the problem, exchange
of information can be the solution. When agents form matches on decentralised markets
such as the labour market, they can exchange a great deal of information before they
even meet - using job advertisements and applications. Rapid and large information flows
through email and internet have the potential to eliminate any lack of information, and
they can thereby reduce search unemployment to a minimum. However, especially when
made online, advertisements and applications can be truthful just as well as they can be
full of lies. Indeed, given that it matters with whom an agent matches, one would expect
that agents manipulate information so as to attain particular matches.
This paper proposes a simple market design that leads agents to exchange truthful
information. We build a model with heterogeneous agents whose type is private informa-
tion, and we let them choose the marketplace where they look for a match. The market
design consists of two requirements: first, each marketplace has to be publicly designated
for a specific set of types. Second, agents are asked to declare their type before entry to a
marketplace and they are only granted entry if they declare a type that the marketplace
is designated for. For example, only if they claim to hold a degree will they be invited to
a graduate job fair. Entering a certain marketplace then becomes a (costless) signal of an
agent’s type.1 Other agents can never observe the true type, so that agents’ bargaining
prior to a match is based on these signals. That is, agents who claim to have a high
type will be expected to produce like a high type. With only mild complementarities in
match production, any incentive to lie then disappears: too much would be expected of
low types for them to still gain from matching incognito with high types.
As a real-world example for the role of complementarities, suppose a low-skilled worker
faces the choice between working at McDonalds and working at McKinsey. While McKin-
sey would pay a higher salary, the worker would have to perform there like her high-skilled
colleagues. The sheer effort and the extra hours needed to reach this performance can
outweigh the benefit of a higher salary, so that the low-skilled worker actually prefers
working at McDonalds. In our model, a low type can conceal the difference between
expected and actual match output by reducing her net share of the output accordingly,
but this reduction can outweigh her gain from higher match production with a high type.
If the match production function is supermodular, so that agents are themselves more
productive when matched to a higher type, the reduction will outweigh the gain: then the
output expected from a match of two higher types rises disproportionately, while actual
match output with one higher type only rises proportionately.
The types in our model can only match with certain higher types if they themselves
1In fact, it is irrelevant for our results whether agents choose a signal and thereby join a marketplace
or whether they choose a marketplace and thereby send a signal.
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behave like those higher types. When the match production function is supermodular,
this behaviour does not pay off, and all agents instead signal their type truthfully. Super-
modularity ensures truthful signals by introducing a single-crossing property into agents’
marginal productivity, rather than into signal costs as in Spence (1973). Hence, none of
our results relies on differential signal costs; after all, writing down an invented CV for
an application is as costly as writing down a truthful CV, and painting an advertised job
in unduly bright colours is as costly as honestly laying out its dull nature. We therefore
normalise signal costs to zero, so that the signals in our model are cheap talk.
In practice, lies in applications and job advertisements certainly occur. Yet they seem
much less frequent than one might think, given how easy it would be to lie. This suggests
that most real-world agents consciously choose not to lie. If so, it remains an open question
whether the choice not to lie is rather intrinsically motivated by agents’ preferences over
matches, as in this paper, or extrinsically motivated, as when agents’ claims are rigorously
assessed. Circumstantial evidence, such as recurrent incidences of fake doctors, documents
that effective assessment is often missing even where strong qualifications are essential.
This evidence supports intrinsic motivation, which includes our argument that expected
performance levels would appear too demanding to underqualified candidates (apart from
a few individuals with boundless self-confidence).
The model can in turn account for real-world behaviour that might puzzle a search
theorist. When a worker is found out to have lied in the application, why is the worker
then typically fired (or not hired in the first place) rather than being kept on at a different
wage? This paper points to asymmetric information: while the worker’s exact qualification
remains unknown to the employer, it is very likely that a worker who lied is underqualified
rather than overqualified. It may then be easier to find replacement rather than to
disentangle lies from truth, thereby determine the worker’s actual qualifications, and
then - if possible at all - adjust the job design to fit these qualifications. Correspondingly,
if a low type in our model signals like a high type, meets a high type, but then does not
behave like a high type, bargaining will fail because bargaining strategies are based on
the signals. All the high type can infer is to be facing some lower type, as higher types
cannot gain from such behaviour. A sufficiently high type then prefers meeting another
agent to a second round of bargaining with the lower type. Therefore, agents do not get
away with reneging on their signals.
When signals thus provide full information, agents know where to find the best avail-
able option and their first meeting results in a match. As long as search frictions are
not so high that agents are even discouraged from one meeting (and therefore do not
participate), the outcome is the same as in the frictionless case: in a setting with frictions
and full information, agents find the best option at first try, and in a frictionless setting
with imperfect information, nothing keeps agents from searching until they find the best
option. Hence, the separating equilibrium of our search model achieves benchmarks set by
Becker’s (1973) frictionless matching model: not just positive assortative matching (likes
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tend to match with likes) but even perfect positive assortative matching (only equal types
match), a stable matching, and maximised aggregate output.
Through the market design proposed here, policy makers can therefore achieve both
a shorter search duration and a more efficient sorting. When interpreted in the context
of frictional labour markets, the design reduces search unemployment: agents are unem-
ployed only until their first meeting. The delay and the costs associated with the first
meeting thus constitute the only difference between the decentralised outcome in the sep-
arating equilibrium and the first-best outcome that could be centrally imposed by a social
planner. In other words, full information allows agents to avoid almost all search costs
(concretely, the costs associated with second and further meetings), so that unconstrained
efficiency is almost achieved here despite frictions.
Finally, this paper makes a technical contribution. Our model and Becker’s (1973)
frictionless setting also have the mild condition for positive assortative matching (PAM)
in common: in both models, the necessary and sufficient condition for perfect PAM is
supermodularity of the match production function. A search model comparable to ours,
but without signals, has been analysed by Shimer and Smith (2000). They establish
(imperfect) PAM under the condition that the match production function, the logarithm
of its first derivative, and the logarithm of its cross-partial derivative are all supermodular.
These conditions are directly comparable to our condition and are unambiguously more
restrictive. From an empirical perspective, one would rather expect a mild condition
because PAM is a pervasive phenomenon: across regions and cultures, more productive
workers tend to be hired by more productive firms and more educated women tend to
marry more educated men.2 Note that the conditions for PAM and for truthful signals
exactly coincide in our model: supermodularity of the match production function here
ensures both sorting and single-crossing.
The paper proceeds as follows. After further related literature has been discussed in
section 2, section 3 specifies a frictional matching market and the procedures of search.
Section 4 defines equilibrium in the model and proposes a separating equilibrium in which
supermodularity suffices for perfect PAM. Its existence is proven step by step through a
series of lemmas in section 5. The separating equilibrium is found to be unique as well
as efficient in section 6. There we also discuss the role played by supermodularity and by
the model’s priors before section 7 concludes. All proofs are provided in the appendix.
2 Relation to the literature
Signals in the context of search have typically been analysed in models of directed search:
sellers post offers and commit to them; having observed the offers, buyers then simul-
taneously choose which seller to visit. As buyers cannot coordinate, queues may result
2As an exemplary reference for these stylised facts, see Mare (1991).
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and only some buyers can buy. This congestion constitutes the only kind of search fric-
tion in directed search models. In a sequential search model such as Shimer and Smith
(2000), the frictions are instead due to agents’ discounting. While sequential search mod-
els analyse agents’ decentralised behaviour in continuous time, directed search models
feature stylised stages at which all agents move simultaneously. The aim of this paper is
to integrate signals into a sequential search model close to Shimer and Smith (2000).
The key difference between our model and directed search, however, concerns the rea-
son why signals are informative. In directed search, the assumption that sellers somehow
commit to their posted offers is almost ubiquitous. This ad-hoc assumption is made
because sellers might otherwise renege on their signals, as we demonstrate in Poeschel
(2012). In other words, the reasons why sellers’ signals are reliable are exogenous to di-
rected search models. We argue in this paper that, in sequential search models, a simple
market design can lead to truthful signals under mild conditions. The core of our analysis
will explore why agents might not have an incentive to renege on their signal, even though
agents can freely choose their signal at no cost.
Being an exception in the directed search literature, Menzio (2007) is much closer to
this paper. He shows for a directed search model with bargaining that cheap talk can
endogenously be informative: expectations created by signals feed back into bargaining, so
that a correlation arises between signals and actual behaviour. In effect, agents are bound
by their signal. The sequential search model in this paper somewhat similarly embeds
strategic bargaining, but signals here are perfectly correlated with the actual types. This
perfect correlation then allows sorting to be perfect in our separating equilibrium.
The analysis in Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) of sorting in a directed search model (with
the commitment assumption) relates to the technical contribution of this paper. They
show that PAM will arise for common meeting technologies if the square root of the match
production function is supermodular. This condition is weaker than in Shimer and Smith
(2000), but still stronger than in Becker (1973) and this paper. Yet our results confirm the
impression from Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) that models with more information in the
search process only require weaker complementarities for PAM. While they focus on links
between these complementarities and agents’ individual matching rates, we focus on links
between the complementarities and agents’ incentives to signal truthfully. By assuming
commitment to posted offers, Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) abstract from the issue of
truthful signals; in turn, we abstract from differences in matching rates by allowing for
any number of marketplaces with constant returns to scale.3
A search model built by Chade (2006) features discounting and noisy signals uncon-
trolled by the agents. Yet these signals are not observed before agents meet. Rather, when
3Several other papers identify conditions for sorting, but are not directly applicable to the set-up
considered here. Notably, Smith (2006) finds log-supermodularity to be the sorting condition in a model
without bargaining, again a stronger condition than in this paper. In Morgan (1998) and Atakan (2006),
supermodularity suffices, but the only search frictions in their models are explicit costs that agents pay
out of pocket for each meeting. By contrast, our model includes explicit costs in addition to discounting.
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agents do meet, they do not observe each others’ true types but only the noisy signal.
Hence search is still random in this model, and the noisy signals in fact add information
frictions to search frictions. Assuming that the noisy signals carry some information -
again for exogenous reasons -, matching is shown to exhibit PAM in a very weak sense:
the distribution of types that a high type might match with first-order stochastically dom-
inates this distribution for a low type.4 This paper primarily differs from Chade (2006)
in that signals in our model are not informative by assumption but are deliberately and
strategically chosen by agents. Moreover, signals are observed before meetings and allow
agents to avoid search costs, thereby tending to reduce the effect of frictions.
Jacquet and Tan (2007) consider a search model with non-transferable utility and
a particular log-supermodular match production function. For such an environment,
Burdett and Coles (1997) found that types segregate into classes and match exclusively
within them. Building on this, Jacquet and Tan (2007) let agents establish any number
of marketplaces, as in our model. They find that each marketplace is populated by only
one class in equilibrium. By going to the appropriate marketplace, each agent can thus
avoid meetings that do not lead to a match and can instead match after the first meeting.
However, perfect PAM cannot be achieved in Jacquet and Tan (2007) because agents
still have an incentive to invade the marketplaces of slightly higher types: precisely because
of frictions, higher types will accept somewhat lower types rather than continue searching.
This incentive is absent in the separating equilibrium our model. The key difference is
private information: in our model, sufficiently high types never accept lower types they
meet because they cannot tell just how low the type is. Only agents whose own type is
sufficiently low expect an unknown lower type to be acceptably close to their type. As a
result, marketplaces are in equilibrium only populated by one type.
Finally, contributions by Hoppe et al. (2009) and Hopkins (2012) consider signals
and sorting in matching tournaments, where match partners are essentially prizes for ex-
ante investments in signals. In both models, agents first select a costly signal of their
privately observed type and then match without frictions. Hopkins (2012) assumes a
single-crossing property and Hoppe et al. (2009) assume a specific multiplicative match
production function that satisfies log-supermodularity. In the symmetric equilibrium,
agents’ signals are then strictly increasing in their types. This leads to perfect PAM at
the matching stage - just as one would have expected, given Becker’s (1973) findings.
However, as there are no frictions in these papers, they cannot explain how truthful
signals can arise despite the incentive to lie that prevents perfect PAM in Jacquet and
Tan (2007).
4The same form of sorting is found in a contribution by Lentz (2010) that does not feature any signals
but allows for search on the job (more generally, search while matched), while search is also random.
Agents in Lentz (2010) and in the related model in Goldmanis et al. (2009) sort only over time. By
contrast, the fundamentally different sorting mechanism in our model can explain PAM already among
graduates in their first job, without invoking stronger conditions.
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3 Model
The market consists of heterogeneous agents who match among themselves. Agents are
indexed by a discrete productivity type x ∈ Θ, where Θ = {x, . . . , x¯} with x > 0. Types
are exogenously given, but only privately observable. For each discrete type, there is
a continuum of agents and the overall mass of agents is normalised to 1. The measure
of agents with types weakly below x ∈ Θ is denoted L(x), where L(·) is a cumulative
distribution function with probability mass function l(·). The mass of agents of type x is
thus given by l(x), and we require l(x) > 0, ∀x.
Time is continuous with an infinite horizon. Each agent is always in one of four
states: matched, searching (that is, unmatched but participating), waiting (for continued
bargaining, as explained below), and not participating. We denote the mass of waiting
agents of type x by κ(x) ≤ l(x) and that of non-participating agents by ν(x) ≤ l(x).
Searching agents can create marketplaces to meet on. We index the N marketplaces
agents use by n, and N may be countably infinite. Agents cannot be on several market-
places simultaneously (i.e. their search activity is indivisible), but they can always switch
between marketplaces without incurring any cost. Let un(x) ≤ l(x) represent the mass of
searching agents of type x on marketplace n. Only searching agents can be met on a mar-
ketplace; waiting agents are temporarily unavailable and agents who match immediately
leave the marketplace. When indifferent whether to engage in search, whether to accept
a match, and whether to stay in a marketplace or switch, an agent respectively searches,
accepts the match, and stays.
Before two agents can match, a meeting between them will have to occur. To distin-
guish between the agents, we will denote one’s type by x and the other’s by y. Agents
can produce together in one of two sectors F and G, where a match between types x
and y generates constant flow output f(x, y) and g(x, y), respectively. The flow output
generated by an unmatched agent is normalised to zero. We assume that types with low
productivity in one sector have a high productivity in the other:
Assumption 1 (Regularity and symmetry). The match production function f(·, ·) is
positively valued (i.e. f : Θ2 7→ R++), strictly increasing, and symmetric (i.e. f(x, y) =
f(y, x)). Let g(·, ·) be the exact mirror image of f(·, ·) so that g(x, y) = f(x¯, y¯) and
g(x¯, y¯) = f(x, y).
Agents can influence whom they meet through their choice of marketplace: each market-
place n belongs to one sector and is characterised by a set Rn of types that the marketplace
is intended for. The set Rn is public information. By choosing to enter marketplace n,
an agent thus sends the (costless) signal x˜ = “x ∈ Rn” to the agents she meets on this
marketplace, which may or may not be a true statement about her privately observed
type x. As every agent who enters a given marketplace sends the same signal, meetings
are random inside a marketplace and are described by a meeting function m(·). With a
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mass of agents
λn =
∑
x∈Θ
un(x)
the flow of meetings in marketplace n equals m(λn) ≤ λn, and m(0) = 0. The meeting
rate on the marketplace is
ηn =
{
m(λn)
λn
if λn 6= 0
0 if λn = 0
(1)
We assume constant returns to scale in meeting, so that agent x faces the same meeting
rate ηn = η across all N marketplaces. Then x must choose her marketplace by the agents
she wants to meet, as she would meet all agents equally quickly. When indifferent, she
randomises over her most preferred marketplaces. Finally, a marketplace can be created
at no cost but must attract agents in order to last. The agent creating marketplace n
irreversibly chooses the sector it belongs to and Rn.
Meeting an agent y on a marketplace with Rn is equivalent to observing the signal
y˜ = “y ∈ Rn”. The agent x in the meeting can only form a belief about the true type y,
as agents never directly observe each other’s types. Let h be the history of the interaction
with some agent, i.e. a set of actions such as the observed signal. We represent a belief as
a probability distribution Ψ(·). Concretely, for each h, the belief held by agent x of the
other agent’s true type y is the probability distribution Ψ(·|h) over Θ. Then x, having
observed h, believes that the other’s type is y with probability mass ψ(y|h). All agents
use Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Next, match output must also be unobservable: knowing f(·, ·), x could otherwise infer
y from observing f(x, y). Let f e(x|h) (and similarly ge(x|h)) denote the match output
that x expects after observing h:
f e(x|h) =
∑
y∈Θ
f(x, y)ψ(y|h)
Agents in a meeting bargain over the division of the match output that they would produce
between them. We model this using a strategic bargaining procedure where only one offer
is made per meeting. The players are Nature and the agents x and y who meet. The
history h records the actions that x has observed thus far, and we simply index histories
in chronological order. When x and y first meet, they already know both signals, so that
h1 = {x˜, y˜}. Nature selects x and y each with probability 12 to move first.
Suppose x is selected. Then h2 = h1∪{x} and x proposes some share pi(x|y) for herself,
according to her bargaining strategy B(x) that assigns an action to every possible history
at which she moves. Hence h3 = h2∪{pi(x|y)} and y responds according to B(y) by choos-
ing an action from the set {“accept”, “reject but stay”, “reject and walk away”}.5 Agents
who walk away immediately continue searching. If y chooses “accept” or “reject and walk
5The fact that agents have met implies that these agents prefer engaging in search to not participating.
It is thus without loss of generality that non-participation is not a further outside option here.
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away”, then h4 will be a terminal history. If she chooses “reject but stay”, then h4 =
h3 ∪ {“reject but stay”} and x chooses from {“continue”, “walk away”}. If x does not
walk away, the same two agents will meet at rate ζ ≥ η for the next round of bargaining,
in which Nature again randomly selects one agent to move first, and so on.
If y accepts, agents match immediately and obtain their respective share as a flow
utility for the duration of the match. Given that y bases her response on the share she
believes would be left for her, i.e. f e(x|h3)− pi(x|y) in sector F (which may be negative),
it can happen that the agreed shares sum to more than f(x, y). However, in this case the
match immediately breaks up: let the second mover also be the residual claimant. Then y
would in this case protest immediately because she does not obtain her agreed share of the
flow payoff. The immediate dissolution of the match is practically the same as bargaining
failure, so that agents then either walk away or meet again to bargain anew. Further,
as each agent can assure herself flow utility 0 by not participating, negative shares will
always be rejected. Shares offered in previous rounds can never be accepted ex post, and
if players never agree nor walk away, both will obtain 0.
Matches dissolve exogenously at constant rate δ. All agents are risk-neutral, observe
everything except other agents’ types and match output, apply a discount rate r (with
0 < r <∞), and seek to maximise the present discounted value of their expected utility.
Because of discounting, the time that elapses before a meeting makes meetings costly. In
addition, we include a second kind of search friction by allowing for explicit cost c ≥ 0
that an agent incurs each time she attends a meeting. Finally, we only assume a minimum
of gains from trade:
Assumption 2 (Gains from trade). The output produced in a match between two
agents of the lowest type, discounted at effective discount rate r + δ, can reimburse both
agents’ explicit costs of one meeting, i.e. 2c ≤ f(x, y)/(r + δ) for sector F .
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Definition of equilibrium
We begin by defining three expected present values: Un(x) as the value to x of searching
in marketplace n, V (x|y) as the value to x of waiting for another bargaining round with
y, and W (x|y) as the value to x from being matched with y. Let the set A(h) com-
prise of all combinations of bargaining strategies (B(x), B(y)) that lead to a subgame-
perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the bargaining game given history h, so that an agreement
is reached immediately and agents match. Let α(·, ·) be an indicator function such that
α(B(x), B(y)) = 1 if (B(x), B(y)) ∈ A(h) and 0 otherwise. In exact analogy, also define
Ω(h) as the set of bargaining strategies that lead to another round of bargaining given h,
and ω(·, ·) as an indicator function such that ω(B(x), B(y)) = 1 if (B(x), B(y)) ∈ Ω(h).
Then the following asset equation expresses, for one marketplace, the expected return on
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searching as the expected gain from a meeting net of search cost c:
rUn(x) = ηn
(
−c+
∑
y∈Θ
α(B(x), B(y)) [W (x|y)− Un(x)]ψ(y|h = {x˜, y˜})
+
∑
y∈Θ
ω(B(x), B(y)) [V (x|y)− Un(x)]ψ(y|h = {x˜, y˜})
)
(2)
where ψ(y|h = {x˜, y˜}) is the probability mass of y that x believes conditional on meeting
y in marketplace n. The first summation thus captures the gain agent x expects in case
of a match, while the second captures the gain expected in case of continued bargaining.
Let us define U(x) as the value of Un(x) that x obtains in equilibrium. As is natural
when signals are involved, we look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of our model.
We will focus our attention on separating equilibria that survive the Intuitive Criterion.6
Because signals are costless all PBE will necessarily be cheap-talk equilibria. A steady-
state PBE of our model, separating or not, requires that the flows into and out of matches
balance for every type (a pointwise steady state), that agents choose all their strategies
optimally, and that agents’ beliefs are consistent with actual equilibrium behaviour.
Definition 1 (Search equilibrium with signals). In a steady-state PBE of the model,
each agent x ∈ Θ
(i) engages in search if and only if U(x) ≥ 0
(ii) optimally chooses a sector-specific marketplace such that ∀n, U(x) ≥ Un(x) given
B(x), B(y) for all y ∈ Θ, and (Rn)Nn=1, where Un(x) is determined by equation (2)
(iii) chooses a stationary subgame-perfect bargaining strategy as arg maxB(x) rU
n(x) given
all B(y) and Rn, noting that W (x|y) depends on the share obtained in bargaining
(iv) holds beliefs that are formed using Bayes’ rule where possible and that are consis-
tent with equilibrium play: given an equilibrium history h, ψ(y|h) = un(y|h) where
un(y|h) is the true probability mass of y in marketplace n conditional on h
and the matching market is in a pointwise steady state, so that the flows into and out of∑N
n=1 u
n(x) +κ(x) balance for each x ∈ Θ. Marketplaces are created until there is no new
marketplace n0 such that Un
0
(x) > Un(x), ∀n holds for any x ∈ Θ.
A PBE only requires agents’ beliefs to be consistent with equilibrium play, not with
actions out of equilibrium. As is well known, a PBE can therefore depend on unreason-
able off-equilibrium beliefs because these beliefs are never tested in equilibrium. Since
unreasonable beliefs are not needed for any of our results, we rule out beliefs that are
6Ku¨bler et al. (2008) report experimental evidence suggesting that pooling equilibria never arise when
some types can benefit from the effective use of signals.
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unreasonable in the sense of the Intuitive Criterion. To do this formally, let us call the
choices of n and B(x) the ’grand strategy’ of agent x, denoted GS(x) = (n,B(x)). Also
define BR(x|h) as the set of continuation strategies GS(x|h) that are best responses for
x. To apply the Intuitive Criterion as an equilibrium refinement, we have to define the
notion of equilibrium domination in our model:
Definition 2 (Equilibrium domination). Given a PBE of the model, the continuation
strategy GS(x|h) is equilibrium-dominated at history h if
U(x) > max
GS(y|h)∈BR(y|h)
U(x|GS(x|h))
where U(x|GS(x)) is the present value to x of searching with strategy GS(x|h).
The Intuitive Criterion then demands that the beliefs of y assign probability 0 to any
type x who would have to pursue equilibrium-dominated strategies to reach the respective
history: ψ(x|h) = 0 if, at a history up to h, x would have had to play an equilibrium-
dominated strategy GS(x|h).
4.2 Putative equilibrium
We next propose that a particular separating equilibrium exists under a simple condition
on the match production function f(·, ·). All we need is a weak and intuitive form of
complementarity known as strict supermodularity (or increasing differences): the marginal
product of one agent in a match is strictly increasing in the type of the other agent.
Definition 3 (Supermodularity). The match production function f(·, ·) is strictly su-
permodular if, for all xH > xL and yH > yL,
f(xH , yH)− f(xL, yH) > f(xH , yL)− f(xL, yL)
A match production function is strictly submodular if the reverse inequality holds.
Further, we refer to the sorting with x = y in all matches as perfect positive assortative
matching (PPAM). We can now propose existence of the following PBE in our model:
Proposition 1 (Existence). Let η and ζ be sufficiently close and let agents’ beliefs assign
probability 0 to equilibrium-dominated actions. Then for any type distribution L(x), strict
supermodularity of f(·, ·) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a separating PBE
in which each agent x ∈ Θ
(i) engages in search: U(x) ≥ 0
(ii) chooses a marketplace n for which the signal x˜ = “x ∈ Rn” is truthful, where n can
only belong to sector F if f(x, y) ≥ g(x, y) for x = y
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(iii) reaches a bargaining agreement in the first meeting and thus matches:
α(B(x), B(y)) = 1 and ω(B(x), B(y)) = 0 for x = y
(iv) correctly believes all signals to be truthful:
ψ(y|h = {x˜, y˜ = “y ∈ Rn”}) = un(y|h = {x˜, y˜ = “y ∈ Rn”}) = 1 for y ∈ Rn.
The market is in pointwise steady state and is perfectly segmented: |Rn| = 1, ∀n.
Crucially, the combination of truthful signals and |Rn| = 1 means that there is only one
type x ∈ Θ on each marketplace. When agents meet exclusively agents of their own type
and then match, the matching that necessarily results is PPAM.
The figure below depicts the overall symmetric structure of the putative equilibrium.
We find in section 5.2 for sector F that all types above a certain threshold x∗F cannot
gain from invading the marketplaces of higher types, while types below x∗F might. Yet
suppose that x∗F lies below (x¯ − x)/2, which will be the case if η and ζ are sufficiently
close. Then the types below x∗F will prefer a marketplace in sector G: as all other types
below (x¯ − x)/2, they are more productive in sector G. By exact analogy to sector F ,
their marketplaces in sector G are not invaded by relatively unproductive types above
the threshold x∗G because all types above (x¯ − x)/2 prefer a marketplace in sector F . If
there is a type x = (x¯− x)/2, the agent randomises over sectors. In short, types choose a
marketplace in the sector where they are more productive and they sort perfectly within
each sector.
x x∗F
x¯−x
2◦
sector G
◦
x∗G x¯◦
sector F
◦
The next section proves proposition 1 through a series of lemmas. Each time, we sepa-
rately consider a component of proposition 1, taking as given that all other components
are indeed as specified in proposition 1. We verify for the component in question, as
applicable, that it is optimal for agents to behave as specified, that a steady state results,
and that beliefs are consistent with equilibrium play.
5 Existence of the putative equilibrium
5.1 Bargaining, participation, and steady state
We first determine the expected present values in the putative equilibrium situation.
Given that beliefs are consistent with equilibrium play (and that |Rn| = 1), we have
ψ(y|h = {x˜, y˜ = “y ∈ Rn”}) = un(y|h = {x˜, y˜ = “y ∈ Rn”})
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If x only meets agents of her own type, then
un(y|h = {x˜, y˜ = “y ∈ Rn”}) = 0 ∀y 6= x (3)
Since every meeting in the putative equilibrium leads to match,
α(B(x), B(y)) = 1 for y = x and ω(B(x), B(y)) = 0 for y = x (4)
For the marketplace chosen in the putative equilibrium, equation (2) thus simplifies to
rU(x) = η [W (x|y)− c− U(x)] (5)
with y = x. Hence the rate of matches equals the rate of meetings, and an agent effectively
incurs costs c each time she matches. Next, the expected return on being matched with y
is the expected flow utility while matched and the loss from match dissolution at rate δ:
rW (x|y) = σ(x|y)− δ[W (x|y)− U(x)] (6)
where σ(x|y) denotes the expected share that x obtains when bargaining with y over the
flow of match output, which is in effect known from truthful signals: for sector F ,
σ(x|y) = 1
2
pi(x|y) + 1
2
[f(x, y)− pi(y|x)] (7)
One can solve equation (5) for U(x) and equation (6) for W (x|y), then use the latter to
substitute for W (x|y) in the former to obtain
rU(x) = β[σ(x|y)− (r + δ)c] (8)
where β = η/(r + δ + η). Now suppose y has been randomly selected to move first in
the bargaining game. In response to the share left for her, x can reject it and continue
searching, which carries the value U(x), or she can reject this share and wait for another
round of bargaining, which carries a value V (x|y). Note that the first mover y cannot
hope to attain a better position than she currently has: at best, she will find herself as
first mover again in a later meeting, be it with the same agent x or another agent of the
same type. As delay is costly, y seeks to seize the opportunity and to ensure that x accepts
her offer. In turn, x will accept any implicitly offered payoff WO(x|y) that satisfies
WO(x|y) ≥ max[V (x|y), U(x)] (9)
as she would otherwise reject the offer. When x moves first, y requires
WO(y|x) ≥ max[V (y|x), U(y)] (10)
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In case of a second meeting, the same logic as before implies that the first mover seeks to
ensure agreement, so that the second meeting can be expected to result in a match. The
second meeting happens at rate ζ, so that
rV (x|y) = ζ [W (x|y)− c− V (x|y)] (11)
in the putative equilibrium. Solving equation (11) for V (x|y) and equation (5) for U(x),
one finds that V (x|y) ≥ U(x) since ζ ≥ η. Hence the outside option U(x) is not binding.
As we also require bargaining strategies to be stationary, the game reduces to a variant of
Rubinstein’s (1982) set-up, and we have the following result (see appendix for all proofs):
Lemma 1 (Bargaining equilibrium). Given truthful signals and given marketplace
choices as in the putative equilibrium situation, the following stationary strategies form
the unique SPE of the bargaining game in sector F :
(i) for herself, agent x always proposes
pi∗(x|y) =
(
1− φ
2
)
f(x, y) + φ(r + δ)c with φ =
ζ − βδ
r + ζ
(12)
When y proposes pi(y|x), x always accepts if and only if pi(y|x) ≤ pi∗(y|x).
(ii) for herself, y always proposes pi∗(y|x) = pi∗(x|y). When x proposes pi(x|y), y always
accepts if and only if pi(x|y) ≤ pi∗(x|y)
Agreement is reached in the first round of bargaining. The expressions for sector G are
obtained by substituting g(·, ·) for f(·, ·).
The essence of the bargaining SPE is that each agent makes offers that leave the other
indifferent, and each agent accepts offers that make her indifferent or better off: the
first-mover takes a share pi∗(x|y) such that the second-mover share
f(x, y)− pi∗(x|y) = φ
2
f(x, y)− φ(r + δ)c
is just enough to prevent the second mover from rejecting. The second-mover share will
still be weakly positive if
φ
2
f(x, y) ≥ φ(r + δ)c ⇔ 2c ≤ f(x, y)
r + δ
which by assumption 2 even holds for f(x, y) = f(x, y). The two indifference conditions
in equations (9) and (10), depending on who moves first, thus together pin down a unique
SPE for each sector. Finally, expected shares in the SPE reflect the symmetry of the
bargaining situation: for sector F ,
σ(x|y) = σ(y|x) = 1
2
pi∗(x|y) + 1
2
[f(x, y)− pi∗(x|y)] = 1
2
f(x, y) (13)
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To ensure that all agents engage in search, c must not be so high that U(x) becomes
negative for some x, since each agent can obtain a payoff 0 by not participating.
Lemma 2 (Participation). Assumption 2 is necessary and sufficient for all agents to
prefer engaging in search to non-participation.
By definition, the mass of matched agents is l(x)−∑Nn=1 un(x)−κ(x)−ν(x). As agents in
the putative equilibrium prefer search to non-participation and reach an agreement in the
first bargaining round, ν(x) = κ(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ Θ. Hence agents only flow from searching
to being matched (at rate η) and back (at rate δ). Equating these flows, we obtain the
pointwise steady state in the putative equilibrium:
δ
l(x)−∑
N (x)
un(x)
 = η∑
N (x)
un(x) ∀x ∈ Θ (14)
where N (x) ≡ {n|Rn = {x}} is the set of all marketplaces on which x meets exclusively
her own type when signals are truthful.
5.2 Marketplace choices, signals and beliefs
In this section, we examine whether any one agent in the putative equilibrium has a
unilateral incentive to deviate by choosing to enter a marketplace in the same sector but
intended for another type, so that the agent’s signal is false. There are two reasons why
we need to worry about such deviations. First, because true types are only privately
observable, agents can perfectly imitate agents of other types by bargaining as these
types would. Second, agents might enter another type’s marketplace but, once in a
meeting, renege on the signal they thereby sent. Since search frictions make switching to
another meeting costly, the other agent in the meeting might still accept the match. For
example, consider a rather high type yH in sector F who matches with xH in the putative
equilibrium. If yH finds herself in a meeting with a type xL < xH , she might nevertheless
grudgingly accept whenever her share of f(xL, yH) is not so far below her expected share
of f(xH , yH) that the costs of another meeting would be justified. Therefore, there can
be an incentive to send false signals and invade other types’ marketplaces.
Let us focus on marketplaces in sector F for the rest of this section, as all results will
analogously apply to sector G. We take as given that all other agents on the marketplace
signal truthfully, that all believe signals to be truthful, and that agents choose sectors as
in the putative equilibrium: then only agents with a type x ≥ (x¯− x)/2 search in sector
F . We proceed by identifying first the conditions under which everyone of these agents
prefers her match in the putative equilibrium (henceforth the equilibrium match) to any
other match in sector F that is available to her (i.e. a mutually acceptable match with
another agent searching in F ). From this, we infer under which conditions there will be
no unilateral incentive to deviate from truthful signals.
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We first compare the equilibrium match to matches with lower types. Let us take the
perspective of some agent with a type xH > (x¯−x)/2, so that lower types necessarily exist
in sector F . We thus want to compare being matched with yH = xH to being matched
with yL, where (x¯ − x)/2 ≤ yL < xH . The expected present discounted values of these
matches are W (xH |yH) and W (xH |yL), respectively. In the spirit of the one-deviation
principle, x reverts to the putative equilibrium strategies after the deviation. Hence, the
asset equations for both rW (xH |yH) and rW (xH |yL) in analogy to equation (6) depend
on the same U(xH) and thus differ only in the expected shares. Solving these two asset
equations respectively for W (xH |yH) and W (xH |yL), we therefore find that
W (xH |yH) > W (xH |yL) ⇔ σ(xH |yH) > σ(xH |yL)
where σ(xH |yH) and σ(xH |yL) denote the expected share obtained by xH in a match with
yH and yL, respectively.
Thus suppose xH signals to be of type xL in order to meet a type yL. Further suppose
that xH continues to behave like a type xL so as to conform to the beliefs of yL, given
that all other agents signal truthfully. Recall from section 5.1 that neither agent’s signal
implies a binding outside option. Hence the bargaining equilibrium described by lemma
1 will be reached in the first round of bargaining. Then the expected flow utility for xH
in the match with yL is
σ(xH |yL) = 1
2
[
f(xH , yL)− φ
2
f(xL, yL) + φ(r + δ)c
]
+
1
2
[
f(xH , yL)−
(
1− φ
2
)
f(xL, yL)− φ(r + δ)c
]
= f(xH , yL)− 1
2
f(xL, yL) (15)
If xH moves first (with probability
1
2
), she leaves a second-mover share to yL as if output
was f(xL, yL) and keeps the rest of the actual output f(xH , yL). If yL moves first, yL
takes the first-mover share of f(xL, yL) for herself and xH obtains the actual remainder.
In an equilibrium match, by contrast, xH would obtain
σ(xH |yH) = 1
2
[(
1− φ
2
)
f(xH , yH) + φ(r + δ)c
]
+
1
2
[
φ
2
f(xH , yH)− φ(r + δ)c
]
=
1
2
f(xH , yH) (16)
Comparing σ(xH |yL) and σ(xH |yH), we find the following:
Lemma 3 (Matches with lower types). In the putative equilibrium, strict supermod-
ularity of f(·, ·) is necessary and sufficient for any agent in sector F to strictly prefer the
equilibrium match to matching with a lower type while perfectly imitating the lower type.
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Next suppose that xH has signalled to be of type xL, has thus met a type yL, but now
wants to renege on the signal. We will find below that xH has to let at least one round
of bargaining fail to actually convince yL of her true type. Here we ask whether reneging
could possibly make the deviation to a match with a lower type worthwhile. By considering
the hypothetical extreme case that yL instantly observes the true type xH , we obtain an
envelope result and thereby a negative answer:
Lemma 4 (Reneging in matches with lower types). Suppose types were instantly
observable in meetings. Consider a type xH in sector F who deviates from the putative
equilibrium situation and meets a type yL, with (x¯− x)/2 ≤ yL < xH .
a) If neither agent’s outside option is binding, the following stationary strategies will form
the unique SPE of the bargaining game and lead to agreement in the first round:
(i) for herself, agent xH always proposes
pi∗(xH |yL) = 2r + ζ
2(r + ζ)
[
f(xH , yL) +
βδ
2r
[
f(xL, yL)− ζ
2r + ζ
f(xH , yH)
]]
+ φ(r + δ)c
When yL proposes pi(yL|xH), xH always accepts if and only if pi(yL|xH) ≤ pi∗(yL|xH).
(ii) for herself, yL always proposes
pi∗(yL|xH) = 2r + ζ
2(r + ζ)
[
f(xH , yL) +
βδ
2r
[
f(xH , yH)− ζ
2r + ζ
f(xL, yL)
]]
+ φ(r + δ)c
When xH proposes pi(xH |yL), yL always accepts if and only if pi(xH |yL) ≤ pi∗(xH |yL).
b) Strict supermodularity of f(·, ·) is sufficient for any agent in sector F to strictly prefer
the equilibrium match to this deviation.
Part a) of lemma 4 may be regarded as a generalisation of lemma 1 to an asymmetric case.
Crucially, part b) finds that even if xH could immediately convince yL of her true type, xH
would strictly prefer the equilibrium match, as she does when she would have to imitate
some lower type. Based on lemmas 3 and 4, we show below that types x ≥ (x¯−x)/2 never
have an incentive to deviate from the putative equilibrium to matches with lower types if
f(·, ·) is supermodular, for any beliefs that lower types might hold about deviants.
In turn, whenever a deviant causes bargaining to fail, the other agent thus knows that
she faces a strictly lower type: for a weakly higher type, a deviation would be equilibrium-
dominated. The other agent now has to choose between two options:7 another round
of bargaining with an evidently lower type or, as in the putative equilibrium, meeting
another agent of her own type (as we consider only a single deviation, another agent
signals truthfully). Define x∗F as the highest one of all thresholds that equalise these
7The same holds when a deviation is only detected after the start of the match: it can only be detected
when agents’ initial bargaining agreement breaks down, so that there is no basis for further production
while agents wait for the new round of bargaining required for renegotiation.
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two options (and similarly x∗G for an agent in sector G), so that rU(x
∗
F ) = rV (x
∗
F |y) or
equivalently
η[W (x∗F |y∗F )− c− U(x∗F )] = ζ
−c+ ∑
y<x∗F
α(B(x∗F ), B(y)) [W (x
∗
F |y)− U(x∗F )]ψ(y|h)
+
∑
y<x∗F
ω(B(x∗F ), B(y)) [V (x
∗
F |y)− U(x∗F )]ψ(y|h)
 (17)
in analogy to equations (5) and (2). If η and ζ were equal, x∗F would not exist: by lemma
4b), x (whose type was observable from a truthful signal) strictly prefers her equilibrium
match to a match with a lower type, so that the left-hand side of equation (17) would
always exceed the right-hand side. The only reason to possibly continue bargaining with a
lower type is that ζ ≥ η. Types x < x∗F are willing to because their own type is sufficiently
low: then the expected type of the deviant is not so far below their type to outweigh the
difference between ζ and η. By contrast, types x ≥ x∗F walk away to meet another agent.
As these arguments are central to our reasoning, we prove them more formally:
Lemma 5 (Equilibrium-dominated strategies). Let f(·, ·) be strictly supermodular
and let η and ζ be sufficiently close so that x∗F ≤ (x¯− x)/2.
a) For any agent in sector F , a deviation such that she meets a weakly lower type with
whom bargaining fails is equilibrium-dominated.
b) Also let agents’ beliefs assign probability 0 to equilibrium-dominated actions and con-
sider a meeting in the putative equilibrium between some x and y in sector F . If x deviates,
y will correctly believe to face a lower type and will walk away.
Let us finally turn to the incentive for lower types to deviate to a match with a higher
type. Consider some agent with a type xL < x¯, so that higher types necessarily exist.
Now we want to compare being matched with an exactly corresponding type yL = xL, as
in the equilibrium match, to being matched with a higher type yH > xL. The lower type
xL has two possibilities: she can either perfectly imitate xH , or she can signal having type
xH in order to meet yH but then renege on the signal.
We have just shown that, if xL reneges in a meeting in sector F with a type yH , then
yH will walk away and xL does not gain from the deviation.
8 Hence, unless xL herself
walks away (without gain from the deviation), she will have to bargain with a type yH
under two constraints: yH believes to face a type xH and bargaining must not fail. Recall
that these are exactly the constraints under which the bargaining strategy of xH in the
putative equilibrium is optimal (see lemma 1), so that xL cannot do better than perfectly
imitate xH : if she is more demanding than xH , bargaining will fail, and if she is less
8If xL instead simply claims to have a lower type, this will not be credible: also a type xH has an
incentive to downplay her type in order to make yH propose and accept lower shares for herself.
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demanding, she will not be optimising. When xL therefore perfectly imitates xH , the
expected flow utility for xL is
σ(xL|yH) = 1
2
[
f(xL, yH)− φ
2
f(xH , yH) + φ(r + δ)c
]
+
1
2
[
f(xL, yH)−
(
1− φ
2
)
f(xH , yH)− φ(r + δ)c
]
= f(xL, yH)− 1
2
f(xH , yH) (18)
If xL moves first, she has to leave yH the second-mover share of f(xH , yH) to avoid being
found out and can thus take whatever is left of the actual output f(xL, yH). If yH moves
first, yH takes the first-mover share of f(xH , yH) for herself and xL obtains the remainder.
By contrast, the expected flow utility for xL from her equilibrium match would be
σ(xL|yL) = 1
2
f(xL, yL) (19)
A comparison of σ(xL|yH) and σ(xL|yL) yields the following result:
Lemma 6 (Matches with higher types). In the putative equilibrium, strict supermod-
ularity of f(·, ·) is necessary and sufficient for any agent in sector F to strictly prefer the
equilibrium match to matching with a higher type while perfectly imitating the higher type.
If also types below (x¯ − x)/2 searched in sector F , then xL might gain from reneging in
a meeting with yH , because a type yH < x
∗
F would not walk away. However, all types
below (x¯− x)/2 prefer sector G, as we argue in the next section. Corollary 1 collects the
conditions identified in this section and the implications for agents’ beliefs and choice of
marketplace:
Corollary 1 (Truthful signals). Let agents’ beliefs assign probability 0 to equilibrium-
dominated actions and let η and ζ be sufficiently close so that x∗F ≤ (x¯ − x)/2. Then
strict supermodularity of f(·, ·) is necessary and sufficient for each agent in sector F to
strictly prefer a marketplace n ∈ N (x) among the marketplaces in sector F , so that the
signal x˜ = “x ∈ Rn” is truthful. Given h = {x˜, y˜}, the only beliefs consistent with truthful
signals are
ψ(y|h = {x˜, y˜ = “y ∈ Rn”}) = un(y|h = {x˜, y˜ = “y ∈ Rn”}) = 1 for y ∈ Rn, n ∈ N (x).
Each agent in sector F essentially finds it optimal to choose a marketplace n ∈ N (x),
and to thereby signal truthfully, because this is the only way to obtain her equilibrium
match, which she prefers to a deviation. As all agents in sector F therefore indeed signal
truthfully, only beliefs that signals are truthful on the marketplaces in the sector can be
consistent with equilibrium play.
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In conclusion, this section has presented an extensive but essentially simple reasoning.
We found that agents in sector F will never deviate from the putative equilibrium to
match with lower types if f(·, ·) is supermodular. A type y in sector F who detects
a deviation should therefore believe to face a lower type; when y can choose between
continued bargaining with a lower type and her equilibrium match, she prefers the latter
because y ≥ x∗F . Lower types can thus only match with y by imitating her type, but they
will not gain from such a deviation if f(·, ·) is supermodular.
5.3 Sector choice and market segmentation
By choosing a marketplace, agents implicitly also choose the sector it belongs to. The
previous section found that agents sort perfectly within sector F , and this result extends
to sector G: by the symmetry between f(·, ·) and g(·, ·) (see assumption 1), strict super-
modularity of f(·, ·) also implies strict submodularity of g(·, ·). Further, if η and ζ are
sufficiently close so that x∗F ≤ (x¯ − x)/2, this simultaneously implies x∗G ≥ (x¯ − x)/2.
Hence results analogous to lemmas 3 through 6 also apply to the types x ≤ (x¯ − x)/2
who may search in sector G in the putative equilibrium, while the conditions for signals
being truthful in sector G and for agents meeting only agents of the same type are even
exactly the same as in corollary 1. It remains to confirm that types optimally self-select
into sectors as proposed in the putative equilibrium:
Lemma 7 (Sector choice). Let η and ζ be sufficiently close so that x∗F ≤ (x¯ − x)/2.
Any agent in the putative equilibrium with a type x < (x¯ − x)/2 then strictly prefers to
search in sector G, while any agent with a type x > (x¯− x)/2 strictly prefers sector F .
Let us now take choices among existing marketplaces as given and concentrate on the
creation of marketplaces within a given sector. Consider three types xL, xM , and xH in
sector F , with (x¯ − x)/2 ≤ xL < xM < xH ≤ x¯. Suppose these types search in the
same marketplace, so that each of them can meet with yL, yM , or yH . We know from
lemma 4 that each xH would prefer a match with yH to a match with yM or yL. The
agents of type xH can profitably set up a new marketplace where R
n = {xH} so that
agents of type xH exclusively meet each other. In the initial marketplace, they would
also meet other types although matches with these types would be less desirable, which
is not offset by any advantage in meeting rates. By setting up an exclusive marketplace,
the congestion externality imposed by these other types is avoided (see Jacquet and Tan
(2007) for details of this logic).
Given our results above, other types would not invade this new exclusive marketplace,
so that the remaining types xM and xL can no longer meet with yH . Among the possible
matches, xM prefers by lemma 4 the match with yM , so that all agents of type xM now
set up an exclusive marketplace with Rn = {xM}, leaving the initial marketplace to the
agents of type xL. This logic applies to any marketplace with different types in either
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sector.9 Hence all types have their own exclusive marketplaces in equilibrium; formally,
|Rn| = 1 for all n. (We will generalise this logic in section 6.4 to show that it does not
only apply in the putative equilibrium, but in any separating equilibrium.) There may
be several exclusive marketplaces for the same type in equilibrium (|N (x)| ≥ 1), as none
of our conclusions is affected by their exact number due to constant returns to scale in
meeting.
By way of summary, this subsection and the preceding have each shown a component
of the putative equilibrium situation to hold, given the other components. We thus found
the pointwise steady state in the PBE. Given a supermodular match production function
and beliefs that rule out equilibrium-dominated actions, agents search in the sector where
they are more productive and seek to meet only exactly corresponding types. All agents
then signal their types truthfully and correctly believe that all other agents on their
marketplaces signal truthfully. With optimal bargaining strategies, every meeting leads
to a match, as one would expect when truthful signals allow agents to know everything
in advance. The matches are only between exactly corresponding types. Our model thus
leads to PPAM under the same weak condition as in Becker’s (1973) frictionless model,
despite two kinds of search frictions. The next section discusses key properties of the
separating equilibrium.
6 Equilibrium properties
6.1 Dependence on priors
Let us first clarify why supermodularity is central to our results. Since types are only
privately observable and nothing keeps agents from imitating other types, an agent may
match incognito with any type she likes. However, because actual match output then dif-
fers from the match output suggested by the signals, the deviant will only remain incognito
if she bears the necessary adjustment: she has to give up as much of her own share as is
necessary to bridge the gap when actual output is lower (otherwise bargaining fails and the
other agent walks out), and she quietly pockets the excess output when actual output is
higher. To explain why a lower type xL would then not match incognito with a higher type
yH > xL, supermodularity is key: f(xH , yH)−f(xL, yH) is the necessary adjustment when
yH otherwise matches with xH in equilibrium, while f(xL, yH)−f(xL, yL) is the extra out-
put produced in comparison to the equilibrium match of xL. With f(xL, yH) = f(xH , yL)
in the latter, as established by equation (27), the necessary adjustment will exceed the
extra output if f(·, ·) is strictly supermodular. From the perspective of a lower type, any
possible gains from higher output with a higher type are therefore more than outweighed
9The logic also applies to types who do not search in the sector but for whom the separating equilibrium
could be sustained; that is, types x with x∗F ≤ x < (x¯ − x)/2 in case of sector F and types x with
(x¯− x)/2 < x ≤ x∗G in case of sector G.
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by the costs from adjustment.
It is crucial for this argument that the necessary adjustment falls entirely on the
deviant xL. This happens when the treatment xL faces is independent of her actual type.
Therefore, our results are obtained under the realistic assumption that true types are
always only privately observable. With publicly observable types, yH would be willing to
compromise when she bargains with a deviant xL, in order to avoid bargaining failure.
Yet under private information, yH instead bases her bargaining behaviour on the signal
sent by xL, which creates a link between signals and payoffs. Now given that xL has to
signal like a type xH in order to meet yH at all, she will be treated exactly like a type
xH at least in the first round of bargaining (and as failure of this round is bad news, a
second round with yH ≥ x∗F never happens). This way, the supermodularity of the match
production function fully translates into supermodularity of the payoffs that determine
signal choice. In effect, supermodularity assumes the role of a single-crossing property
in our model and we thus obtain a fully separating equilibrium even though signals are
costless. Separation is therefore not driven by differences in the cost of signals, but by
differences in marginal productivity of the same agent over different matches.
6.2 Efficiency
The separating equilibrium we have identified is efficient in a number of important re-
spects. First and foremost, search costs are minimised, both for each agent individually
and overall: every meeting results in a match, so that agents match after an expected
search time of 1/η. This is the minimum delay because a meeting necessarily precedes a
match. In a random search model, each match would typically be preceded by a number
of unsuccessful meetings, and only by chance will the first meeting of an agent result
in a match. Therefore, search costs in random search models are at least as high from
the individual perspective as in our model with truthful signals, and strictly higher in
expectation as well as on aggregate. Second, note that all agents match in equilibrium so
that there is no unrealised surplus left in the form of agents who never match. On the
contrary, Becker (1973) proved the following result:
Corollary 2 (Output efficiency). If the match production function is strictly super-
modular, PPAM will maximise aggregate output.
Random search models, be it with or without supermodularity of the match production
function, do in general not maximise aggregate match output, as they lead to a certain
degree of mismatch instead of PPAM. Finally, among the mutually acceptable matches,
agents in the equilibrium we found always obtain the match they most prefer. This again
contrasts starkly with random search models, where the match an agent expects is the
expectation over the mutually acceptable matches, not the most preferred one of them.
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6.3 Stability
In this section, we examine whether the equilibrium matching we found is a stable match-
ing. Because this equilibrium is symmetric, our notation can abstract from the distinction
between types and individual agents without loss of generality. Suffice to let σ(x) denote
the expected flow utility that an agent of type x obtains under a particular matching.
Recall that σ(x) = σ(x|y) if x and y are matched in this matching and σ(x) = 0 if x
remains unmatched. We can then define stability as follows:
Definition 4 (Stable matching). The equilibrium matching is stable if σ(x) satisfies
σ(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Θ and there is no match between any two agents with types x and y
such that σ(x|y) > σ(x) and σ(y|x) > σ(y).
It is worth noting that a stable matching in this model is by definition also in the core.10
We find that supermodularity of the match production function is a sufficient condition
here for PPAM to be a stable matching:
Corollary 3 (Stability of PPAM). Whenever it exists, the separating equilibrium de-
scribed by the putative equilibrium leads to a stable matching.
A stable matching is a most unusual result in a model with search frictions. In random
search models, agents cannot search selectively and accept any type from a certain range
because search frictions make continued search undesirable. A stable matching cannot
be expected to arise under such circumstances and is very unlikely to arise by chance
whenever the number of different types is not trivially small. Stable matchings normally
only arise in frictionless models. We attribute the reason that a stable matching is achieved
here despite search frictions to the signals: they allow agents to pursue their search almost
as if there were no search frictions.
Adachi (2003) shows for a fairly general search model that the set of equilibria will
reduce to the set of stable matchings in a model a` la Gale and Shapley (1962) if search
frictions become negligible. Our result in this section qualifies this finding in so far as
search frictions remain in our model because agents do not meet immediately (η < ∞)
and incur costs from meetings (c ≥ 0), and yet a stable matching results. This suggests
that frictions do not prevent a stable matching in a search model as long as they do
not keep agents from meeting only specifically chosen types. Intuitively, arbitrarily high
frictions do not have any effect as long as agents participate and then find ways to match
like in a frictionless environment.
10The notion of the core implicitly assumes side payments within a coalition, so that only the coalition’s
total utility counts. For example, side payments in Becker (1973) ensure that agents end up in the match
generating the highest match output, among the available matches. In our model without side payments,
each agent’s σ(x) in the core has to weakly exceed the utility of being single and of any other available
match (while a match is available to x if σ(y|x) > σ(y)). These are the requirements in definition 4.
23
6.4 Uniqueness
While we have shown that a particular separating equilibrium exists, this section argues
that it is unique. The first thing to note is that, by its very nature, a separating equilibrium
is characterised by truthful signals.11 In section 5.3, truthful signals lead to marketplaces
where agents meet exclusively their own type. This result generalises:
Lemma 8 (Market segmentation). Agents will meet only their own type in any sepa-
rating equilibrium if f(·, ·) is strictly supermodular.
Therefore, PPAM is the unique matching that may result in any separating equilibrium
of our model. We can now conclude more comprehensively:
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness). Whenever it exists, the separating equilibrium described
by the putative equilibrium is unique up to off-equilibrium beliefs.
No formal proof is needed, as proposition 2 follows from our earlier results. We know
from lemma 8 that any separating equilibrium would have to lead to PPAM, so that other
separating equilibria would have to differ in agents’ beliefs, their choice of marketplace,
their bargaining strategy, or in the steady state. However, lemma 8 implies that choosing
a marketplace n ∈ N (x) in the sector where one is more productive is the uniquely
optimal choice rule for x. When signals are therefore truthful, the unique bargaining SPE
in section 5.1 always results. Then only one specification of beliefs about equilibrium
actions will be compatible with these choices.
Finally, as the bargaining SPE ensures agreement in the first round of bargaining,
κ(x) = 0 for all x ∈ Θ and in any separating equilibrium. Since this agreement to
match is reached with an agent of the same type, assumption 2 is sufficient to ensure
participation of all types, as shown in section 5.1. Hence also ν(x) = 0, ∀x ∈ Θ, so that
equation (14) applies to the steady state and determines a unique mass for the matched
and for the unmatched agents of each type. Hence, separating equilibria other than the
putative equilibrium can only differ in beliefs about off-equilibrium actions.
7 Conclusions
This paper has introduced costless signals into a search model with transferable utility.
A simple market design has been proposed that leads agents to signal truthfully. We
thus find a unique separating equilibrium characterised by perfect sorting, minimised
search duration and search costs, and maximised overall match output. These efficiency
benchmarks are virtually never met by random search models because frictions lead to
lengthy search and to some mismatch. In our model, signals allow agents to avoid this, so
11We ignore separating equilibria where signals are not truthful yet still informative because they are
linked by a one-to-one mapping to agents’ true types, and this mapping forms the basis of agents’ correct
beliefs. Such equilibria would only be variants of equilibria with truthful signals.
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that signals largely offset the effect of frictions on efficiency. This role of signals reflects the
pervasive use of effective communication in real-world matching markets that facilitates
search.
PAM in the separating equilibrium only requires supermodularity of the match pro-
duction function, i.e. the same condition as in a frictionless model. While this condition
is unambiguously weaker than the conditions in random search models such as Shimer
and Smith (2000), it does not merely ensure PAM, but even perfect PAM. To the best
of our knowledge, perfect sorting has not resulted before in a model with discounting or
explicit search costs. The key is to allow for more information: supermodularity here does
not only ensure enough complementarity for sorting but also ensures truthful signals that
help agents sort. Supermodularity thereby replaces a single-crossing condition. Hence,
compared to models with random search, a model with more information in the search
process appears to generate sorting more easily.
Sorting is likely to become more important as technological and societal progress
favours specialisation. At the same time, many new means have appeared of effective
and rapid communication that might, as in our paper, support sorting. Such means
of communication and the greater availability of information may therefore be expected
to increase efficiency, but also to deepen segregation. In any case, the interaction of
specialisation and communication offers ample scope for further research.
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A Proofs
Proof of lemma 1. Since outside options are not binding, y maximises pi(y|x) subject to
WO(x|y) ≥ V (x|y) whenever she moves first. When match output is f(x, y) and y takes pi(y|x)
for herself, f(x, y)− pi(y|x) would be left for x. Therefore,
rWO(x|y) = f(x, y)− pi(y|x)− δ [WO(x|y)− U(x)] (20)
while W (x|y) and V (x|y) are determined by
rW (x|y) = σ(x|y)− δ [W (x|y)− U(x)] (21)
rV (x|y) = ζ[W (x|y)− c− V (x|y)] (22)
Use equation (21) to substitute for W (x|y) in equation (22) and solve for V (x|y). After also
solving (20) for WO(x|y), we can rewrite WO(x|y) ≥ V (x|y) as
f(x, y)− pi(y|x) + δU(x) ≥ ζ
r + ζ
[σ(x|y) + δU(x)− (r + δ)c] (23)
Substituting for rU(x) and then for σ(x|y) from equations (8) and (7), respectively, this is
(2r + ζ + βδ) [f(x, y)− pi(y|x)] ≥ (ζ − βδ) [pi(x|y)− 2(r + δ)c] (24)
after collecting terms. As y raises pi(y|x) the left-hand side of equation (24) linearly falls,
while the right-hand side stays constant. Hence this constraint will hold with equality for the
equilibrium value of pi(y|x). When x moves first, the constraint is analogously found as
(2r + ζ + βδ) [f(x, y)− pi(x|y)] ≥ (ζ − βδ) [pi(y|x)− 2(r + δ)c] (25)
As binding constraints, equations (24) and (25) are two equations in two unknowns, so that they
determine a unique equilibrium. By the symmetry of these equations, we infer pi(x|y) = pi(y|x).
When we make this substitution in either equation and solve, we obtain the expression in lemma
1. Because both first-mover shares have been derived under the constraint that the second mover
accepts, agreement is reached in the first round of bargaining. Finally, subgame perfection as in
Rubinstein (1982) holds because present values such as V (x|y) and U(x) incorporate optimising
behaviour in every later subgame. The proof for sector G proceeds analogously. 
Proof of lemma 2. As match output is the only source of utility in the model, agents who
do not engage in search obtain payoff 0. Then agent x will only engage in search if U(x) ≥ 0.
By equation (8), this requires
c ≤ σ(x|y)/(r + δ) ⇔ 2c ≤ f(x, y)/(r + δ)
using equation (13). If this holds for f(x, y), as stated in assumption 2, then it will also hold
for the output generated in any other match because f(x, y) is strictly increasing in x and y by
assumption 1. This carries over to sector G since f(x, y) = g(x¯, y¯). 
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Proof of lemma 3. Any type xH > (x¯−x)/2 in sector F will strictly prefer the equilibrium
match to a match with a lower type yL ≥ (x¯ − x)/2 if W (xH |yH) > W (xH |yL). As argued
before, this is equivalent to
σ(xH |yH) > σ(xH |yL)
⇒ f(xH , yH)− f(xH , yL) > f(xH , yL)− f(xL, yL) (26)
using equations (15) and (16). Next, note that we can write
f(xH , yL) = f(yH , xL) = f(xL, yH) (27)
where the first equality holds because xH = yH and yL = xL, while the second equality holds by
symmetry of f(·, ·) (see assumption 1). Therefore substituting f(xL, yH) for f(xH , yL) on the
left-hand side of equation (26) only, we obtain the equation in definition 3. By this definition,
strict supermodularity of f(·, ·) is necessary and sufficient for the equation to hold. 
Proof of lemma 4, part a). Agents xH ≥ (x¯−x)/2 and yL ≥ (x¯−x)/2 in sector F would
respectively accept if
WO(xH |yL) ≥ max[V (xH |yL), U(xH)], WO(yL|xH) ≥ max[V (yL|xH), U(yL)]
If outside options are not binding and yL moves first, she will maximise pi(yL|xH) subject to
WO(xH |yL) ≥ V (xH |yL). As players revert to the putative equilibrium after a match break-up,
rWO(xH |yL) = f(xH , yL)− pi(yL|xH)− δ
[
WO(xH |yL)− U(xH)
]
(28)
while W (xH |yL) and V (xH |yL) are determined by
rW (xH |yL) = σ(xH |yL)− δ [W (xH |yL)− U(xH)] (29)
rV (xH |yL) = ζ[W (xH |yL)− c− V (xH |yL)] (30)
Use equation (29) to substitute for W (xH |yL) in equation (30) and solve for V (xH |yL). After
also solving (28) for WO(xH |yL), we can rewrite WO(xH |yL) ≥ V (xH |yL) as
f(xH , yL)− pi(yL|xH) + δU(xH) ≥ ζ
r + ζ
[σ(xH |yL) + δU(xH)− (r + δ)c] (31)
With σ(xH |yL) defined in analogy to equation (7), equation (31) becomes
(2r + ζ) [f(xH , yL)− pi(yL|xH)] ≥ ζpi(xH |yL)− 2 [δrU(xH) + ζ(r + δ)c] (32)
after collecting terms. Using the results from lemma 1 in equation (8),
rU(xH) = β
[
1
2
f(xH , yH)− (r + δ)c
]
(33)
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Thus substituting for rU(xH) in equation (32), we obtain
(2r + ζ) [f(xH , yL)− pi(yL|xH)] ≥ ζpi(xH |yL)− βδf(xH , yH)− 2(ζ − βδ)(r + δ)c (34)
As before, the left-hand side of equation (34) linearly falls as yL raises pi(yL|xH), while the right-
hand side stays constant. This constraint will therefore hold with equality. The same applies to
the analogous constraint for the case that xH moves first:
(2r + ζ) [f(xH , yL)− pi(xH |yL)] ≥ ζpi(yL|xH)− βδf(xL, yL)− 2(ζ − βδ)(r + δ)c (35)
As a system of two binding constraints in two unknowns, equations (34) and (35) then deter-
mine a unique equilibrium. Solving them simultaneously, one obtains the expressions given for
pi∗(xH |yL) and pi∗(yL|xH) in lemma 4. The equilibrium is subgame-perfect because the present
values incorporate optimising behaviour in following subgames. 
Proof of lemma 4, part b). We want to prove that some xH > (x¯ − x)/2 in sector F
strictly prefers the equilibrium match to a match with a type yL, where (x¯ − x)/2 ≤ yL < xH ,
when the type xH is observed before bargaining begins. First suppose the outside option of xH
binds, V (xH |yL) < U(xH), where
rV (xH |yL) = ζ[W (xH |yL)− c− V (xH |yL)], rU(xH) = η[W (xH |yH)− c− U(xH)] (36)
Solving equation (36) respectively for V (xH |yL) and U(xH), we write V (xH |yL) < U(xH) as
ζ(r + η)[W (xH |yL)− c] < η(r + ζ)[W (xH |yH)− c] (37)
From ζ ≥ η it follows that ζ(r + η) ≥ η(r + ζ). Equation (37) thus requires W (xH |yL) <
W (xH |yH), which means that xH strictly prefers her equilibrium match whenever her outside
option binds. Therefore suppose instead that neither agent’s outside option binds, so that the
results from part a) apply. Then
σ(xH |yL) = 1
2
pi∗(xH |yL) + 1
2
[f(xH , yL)− pi∗(yL|xH)]
=
1
2
[
f(xH , yL) +
βδ
2r
[f(xL, yL)− f(xH , yH)]
]
Recalling that σ(xH |yH) = 12f(xH , yH), we will thus have σ(xH |yH) > σ(xH |yL) if
f(xH , yH) > f(xH , yL) +
βδ
2r
[f(xL, yL)− f(xH , yH)]
which holds because f(xH , yH) > f(xH , yL) and f(xL, yL) − f(xH , yH) < 0. We conclude that
xH strictly prefers her equilibrium match when neither outside option binds. This preference
extends to the case when only the outside option of yL binds, as xH then cannot be better off
than in the case when neither outside option binds. Suppose it did make xH better off, so that
the share for xH increases. Since agents split output, the share for yL decreases accordingly.
Then yL would choose not to take her outside option, which therefore cannot be binding. 
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Proof of lemma 5, part a). We have to establish that any agent xH ≥ (x¯−x)/2 in sector
F always prefers, for any beliefs of some yL with (x¯ − x)/2 ≤ yL ≤ xH , her equilibrium match
to a deviation such that she meets yL with whom bargaining fails. For xH = yL, lemma 1
implies that xH would have preferred reaching a bargaining agreement with yL. For xH > yL,
we have to consider all possible beliefs held by yL about the potential match output f(x, y)
when bargaining fails:
(i) fe(yL|h) = f(xH , yL) so that yL believes to face the true type xH . By lemma 4, xH
strictly prefers her equilibrium match.
(ii) fe(yL|h) > f(xH , yL) so that yL overestimates potential match output and thus believes
to face a type even higher than xH . By the same argument as in the proof of part b)
of lemma 4, yL does not believe the outside option of xH to bind: if it did, x would
have had to pursue an equilibrium-dominated strategy. Observe that both pi∗(yL|xH) and
f(xH , yL)− pi∗(xH |yL) in lemma 4 are non-decreasing in xH , whether or not the outside
option of yL binds. Hence yL demands weakly higher shares than under (i). Because xH
strictly prefers her equilibrium match under (i), she still prefers her equilibrium match
when yL is more demanding.
(iii) f(xH , yL) > f
e(yL|h) > f(xL, yL) so that yL underestimates potential match output but
still believes to face a higher type. Note that f(xL, yL) is then a lower bound for f
e(yL|h).
By lemma 3, xH strictly prefers her equilibrium match if yL believes to face xL (and
xH imitates xL to avoid bargaining failure). By the same arguments as under (ii), if yL
believes to face a higher type xH > xL, she will not believe the outside option of xH to
bind and will demand weakly higher shares. Then xH still prefers her equilibrium match.
(iv) fe(yL|h) = f(xL, yL) so that yL believes to face the same type as her own type. By lemma
3, xH strictly prefers her equilibrium match.
(v) fe(yL|h) < f(xL, yL) so that yL believes to face a lower type. By the definition of x∗F
in equation (17), if x∗F ≤ (x¯ − x)/2 then yL prefers meeting another agent rather than
continued bargaining with xH who is perceived as a lower type. Hence yL walks away and
xH would prefer her equilibrium match to this deviation.
Hence the deviation in question is equilibrium-dominated for weakly higher types than yL. 
Proof of lemma 5, part b). When we require that agents’ beliefs assign probability
0 to equilibrium-dominated actions and that f(·, ·) be strictly supermodular, any type yL ≥
(x¯−x)/2 must believe by part a) of lemma 5 to face a lower type when bargaining fails, so that
fe(yL|h) < f(xL, yL). By the argument under (v) in the proof of part a), yL then walks away
when bargaining fails. 
Proof of lemma 6. Any type xL in sector F , with (x¯− x)/2 ≤ xL < x¯, will strictly prefer
the equilibrium match to a match with a higher type yH if W (xL|yL) > W (xL|yH), which is
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equivalent to
σ(xL|yL) > σ(xL|yH)
⇒ f(xH , yH)− f(xL, yH) > f(xL, yH)− f(xL, yL)
using equations (18) and (19). By equation (27), we can replace f(xL, yH) on the right-hand
side by f(xH , yL). Hence strict supermodularity is necessary and sufficient for this equation to
hold. Finally, for the type x¯, a higher type than in the equilibrium match does not exist. 
Proof of corollary 1. Consider some arbitrary unmatched agent in sector F and call this
exemplary type xE . Recall that N (xE) ≡ {n|Rn = {xE}}. Given the choice of bargaining
strategy and given all other agent’s choices in the putative equilibrium, an agent of type xE will
obtain her equilibrium match with an agent of type yE = xE if she chooses a marketplace n ∈
N (xE). Further given that agents meet exclusively their own type in the putative equilibrium,
|Rn| = 1 for all n. Hence xE will obtain her equilibrium match only if she chooses a marketplace
n ∈ N (xE).
By lemmas 3 through 6, xE will strictly prefer this match to any other match in sector F
if f(·, ·) is supermodular, η and ζ are sufficiently close, and agents’ beliefs rule out equilibrium-
dominated actions. Because type xE was arbitrarily chosen, the reasoning extends to any type
in the sector. If signals are therefore truthful, then un(y|h = {x˜, y˜ = “y ∈ Rn”}) = 1 for y ∈ Rn,
and agents’ beliefs can only be consistent if ψ(y|h = {x˜, y˜ = “y ∈ Rn”}) = 1 for y ∈ Rn. 
Proof of lemma 7. Suppose to the contrary that an agent with a type x sets up a mar-
ketplace in sector F . Instead of x, we write xL to keep the proof general. Let us first focus on
matches between xL and some y < (x¯− x)/2, recalling that truthful signals cannot be expected
from types below x∗F . To provide an envelope result, consider as in lemma 4 the most favourable
case for xL that agents instantly observe each others’ types. If xL then matches with another
agent of type yL = xL, the symmetry of the bargaining situation will imply
σ(xL|yL) = 1
2
f(xL, yL)
while xL would obtain
1
2g(xL, yL) in her equilibrium match in sector G. Since xL < (x¯− x)/2,
we know that g(xL, yL) > f(xL, yL), and hence xL strictly prefers sector G. Alternatively, the
other agent has a higher type yH . Suppose again the most favourable case for xL that the
outside option of yH does not bind. Suppose that the outside option of xL to search in sector G
also does not bind (if it does, the same logic as in the proof of lemma 4, part b) will imply that
xL strictly prefers sector G). Then we can proceed as in the proof of lemma 4, part a) with the
exception that we replace equation (33) by the value to xL of searching in sector G, since this
option is always available to her:
rU(xL) = β
[
1
2
g(xL, yL)− (r + δ)c
]
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We find the expressions for the bargaining shares as
pi∗(xL|yH) = 2r + ζ
2(r + ζ)
[
f(xH , yL) +
βδ
2r
[
g(xH , yH)− ζ
2r + ζ
g(xL, yL)
]]
+ φ(r + δ)c
pi∗(yH |xL) = 2r + ζ
2(r + ζ)
[
f(xH , yL) +
βδ
2r
[
g(xL, yL)− ζ
2r + ζ
g(xH , yH)
]]
+ φ(r + δ)c
The expected share for xL is in this case
σ(xL|yH) = 1
2
pi∗(xL|yH) + 1
2
[f(xL, yH)− pi∗(yH |xL)]
=
1
2
[
f(xL, yH) +
βδ
2r
[g(xH , yH)− g(xL, yL)]
]
Agent xL will strictly prefer her equilibrium match in sector G if
g(xL, yL) > f(xL, yH) +
βδ
2r
[g(xH , yH)− g(xL, yL)]
Noting that g(xH , yH)− g(xL, yL) < 0, this holds for any type xL as long as yH < (x¯− x)/2 so
that g(xL, yL) > f(xL, yH). As x
∗
F ≤ (x¯− x)/2, this holds in particular for all yH < x∗F . Hence
type x strictly prefers her equilibrium match in sector G. Now consider the second lowest type
instead: this type cannot match anymore with x in sector F , so that the logic above now applies
to this type, who therefore strictly prefers sector G. The argument can be repeated for all types
x < (x¯− x)/2.
Let us now focus on matches between xL and some y ≥ (x¯− x)/2. Since therefore y ≥ x∗F ,
the definition of x∗F implies that y prefers searching for her equilibrium match to meeting any
types below x∗F . The same preference keeps y from searching on a marketplace with R
n = {x}
for x∗F ≤ x < x¯ but x 6= y: lemmas 3 through 6 extend to all y ≥ x∗F and were limited to
y ≥ (x¯− x)/2 only for expositional reasons. As explained in section 5.3, y also does not search
on mixed marketplaces for types y ≥ x∗F . Finally, if xL chooses Rn = {y} for the marketplace,
then y will believe signals to be truthful and will walk away after bargaining fails. Therefore, xL
can only match with any y ≥ (x¯− x)/2 by perfectly imitating her. By lemma 6, xL would then
obtain less than 12f(xL, yL), and since g(xL, yL) > f(xL, yL), yL strictly prefers her equilibrium
match in sector G. Analogous arguments, using x¯ instead of x above, prove that all types
x > (x¯− x)/2 strictly prefer sector F . 
Proof of corollary 2. The proof given in Becker (1973) applies to our set-up and we
essentially repeat it here. Let f(·, ·) be strictly supermodular and index types in sector F by
1, 2, . . . I such that x1 < x2 < . . . < xI . If PPAM maximises aggregate output, then
I∑
j=1
f(xj , yij ) <
I∑
i=1
f(xi, yi) for all permutations (i1, i2, . . . iI) 6= (1, 2, . . . I)
Suppose to the contrary that aggregate output is maximised by some permutation i1, i2, . . . iI
for which i1 < i2 < . . . < iI does not hold. Then the permutation includes at least one j0 such
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that ij0 > ij0+1. By strict supermodularity of f(·, ·),
f(xj0+1, yij0 )− f(xj0 , yij0 ) > f(xj0+1, yij0+1)− f(xj0 , yij0+1)
because xj0+1 > xj0 while yij0 > yij0+1 . After rewriting this as
f(xj0 , yij0+1) + f(xj0+1, yij0 ) > f(xj0 , yij0 ) + f(xj0+1, yij0+1)
the left-hand side represents the match production under PPAM, while the right-hand side
represents the match production under the permutation i1, i2, . . . iI . As the former exceeds the
latter, the permutation i1, i2, . . . iI does not maximise aggregate output. 
Proof of corollary 3. Recall that the separating equilibrium exists, and that it leads to
PPAM, provided f(·, ·) is strictly supermodular and η and ζ are sufficiently close. Now suppose
that PPAM is not a stable matching. Then there must be a match between unequal types that
is preferred by both types to matches with exactly corresponding types. However, given strict
supermodularity of f(·, ·), matching with a lower type is an equilibrium-dominated action for
the higher type in any match between unequal types in sector F , by the proof of lemma 5.
Likewise, such a match is an equilibrium-dominated action for the lower type in sector G. By
lemma 7, there is no agent who wishes to switch sectors, so that a match between unequal types
that is preferred by both does not exist. Finally, lemma 1 implies together with assumption 1
that σ(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ Θ under PPAM. 
Proof of lemma 8. Suppose there is at least one marketplace n =M in which, with truthful
signals, agents do not only meet their own type, so that two or more types meet. Focus on the
lowest type yL in M. This type must be the most preferred feasible type of some higher type
xH > yL in M, otherwise the higher types would exclude yL from M to reduce congestion.
We will show that such a marketplaceM cannot exist in a separating equilibrium. When xH and
yL bargain, V (xH |yL) ≥ U(xH) because xH most prefers yL and continued bargaining guarantees
a meeting with yL at rate η. While U(yL) is unknown, yL could choose in any separating
equilibrium to meet only agents of her own type on an exclusive marketplace n = L. As part
of a separating equilibrium, the situation in L would correspond to the putative equilibrium
situation in sector F , say, and because of the symmetry when yL and xL bargain in L,
pi∗(xL|yL) = pi∗(yL|xL) ⇒ σ(yL|xL) = 1
2
f(xL, yL)
independently of outside options. As L is always an option for yL, the payoff yL would obtain
there constitutes a lower bound for U(yL), denoted U(yL). With equation (8), it is found as
rU(yL) = β
[
1
2
f(xL, yL)− (r + δ)c
]
Next observe that xH cannot do better in a match with yL than to leave yL only with the
payoff U(yL) in expectation, so that the payoff to xH in this case constitutes an upper bound
W (xH |yL). Now suppose that an agent of type yH = xH sets up an exclusive marketplace n = H
32
for her type. If this creates a profitable deviation for xH who currently most prefers yL, the
supposed marketplace M cannot exist in equilibrium. The symmetry in H would lead to
pi∗(xH |yH) = pi∗(yH |xH) ⇒ σ(xH |yH) = 1
2
f(xH , yH)
again as in the putative equilibrium situation in sector F . As an envelope case, suppose xH
obtains W (xH |yL) in a match with yL in M and now faces the choice between this match and
a match with yH in H. Part b) of lemma 4 applies to this choice (with U(yL) = U(yL)) and
establishes a strict preference for the match with yH over the match with yL. As xH meets yH
at rate η and yL at most at rate η, this preference also translates into a strict preference for
marketplace H. Hence xH has a profitable deviation from M to H even when W (xH |yL) is
obtained in M. By the same reasoning, yH also gains from setting up H. 
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